The mythical monolith: American China policy and the Sino-Soviet split, 1945--1972 by Blunt, Rhonda Smither
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1978 
The mythical monolith: American China policy and the Sino-Soviet 
split, 1945--1972 
Rhonda Smither Blunt 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Asian History Commons, International Relations Commons, and the United States History 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Blunt, Rhonda Smither, "The mythical monolith: American China policy and the Sino-Soviet split, 
1945--1972" (1978). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625039. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-fq3z-5545 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE MYTHICAL MONOLITHs 
AMERICAN CHINA POLICY 
AND THE 
SINO-SOYIET SPLIT, 19^5-1972
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Rhonda Smither Blunt 
1978
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Author 
Approved, May 1978
Edward P . Crapol
>rvg&v—
Richard B. Sherman
Crai^/N. Canning ^
DEDICATION
This study is dedicated to my husband, Allen Blunt, 
for his moral support and practical assistance in 
running our home while I have been occupied with graduate 
work.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................   iv
ABSTRACT...................  vi
INTRODUCTION................... .. . . . . . . . . . .  2
CHAPTER I. CHINA, 19^5-1972: MYTH, MISPERCEPTION,
AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES .  .................  . .6
CHAPTER II. CREATION OF ORTHODOXY: THE CHINA BLOC,
THE CHINA LOBBY, THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION,
a n d  joseph McCarthy..............................30
CHAPTER III. AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE 3IN0-S0VIET
SPLIT: 1956-1972 ............. ^6
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION...........................   . 914-
BIBLIOGRAPHY   . . .  100
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This writer wishes to express her appreciation to 
Dr. Edward P. Crapol who, as thesis director, contributed 
significantly to this study. The writer is also indebted 
to Dr. George E. Munro under whose guidance this work was 
first begun as an undergraduate project at Virginia 
Commonwealth University.
v
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate through 
a specific case study how profoundly foreign policy is 
directed by domestic considerations— considerations 
which ultimately rely upon our perceptions of ourselves 
and others“-perceptions that are subject to manipulation, 
coercion, and distortion.
It is the thesis of this work that American China 
policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet rela­
tions between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic 
affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. This 
misperception began within ourselves and was fed, 
reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the 
policymaking process.
Chapter I deals with American China.policy between 
19^5 and 1972. Chapter II concentrates upon domestic 
political and intellectual influences which provided 
the ambience for misperception in the formulation of 
China policy. Attention is given to the disruptive 
effects of the China bloc, the China Lobby, Jpseph 
McCarthy, and the Committee of One Million. Chapter 
III presents a survey of the perception of the Sino- 
Soviet split, 1956-1972, on the part of American 
academicians, journalists, and policymakers.
The results suggest that the irrational fear of 
Communism created by the various China lobbyists and 
Senator McCarthy molded China policy into a rigid 
orthodoxy, drove Asia scholars into conservatism, and 
distorted perception of the Sino-Soviet split on the 
part of American academicians and policymakers.
THE MYTHICAL MONOLITH: 
AMERICAN CHINA POLICY 
AND THE 
SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, 194-5-1972
2INTRODUCTION
From our first smack on the buttocks to our final
gasp for air we all respond to the world around us. When
we stop responding we are dead, or may as well be. Our
response is not always to objective reality, however, but
1
to a perception of it. In other words, men frequently 
respond to fictions they themselves have created. This is 
true of relationships between individuals, and unfortunately, 
it is carried into relationships between nations, as well. 
Thus, international relations are often a matter of 
faulty perception rather than of objective reality. To 
say that there are no objective problems in international 
affairs would be folly, of course. But world politics 
lends itself all too readily to the development of wide 
gaps between what reality is and the way it is perceived. 
Because of this, perception probably plays as important
2a role in international relations as does reality itself. 
Perception is the essence of this work--perception of 
China and the Sino-Soviet conflict as it unfolded.
Chapter I will deal with American China policy 
between 19^5 and 1972, which was, unfortunately, founded 
upon a large measure of myth and misperception. Chapter II 
will concentrate upon domestic political and intellectual 
influences which provided the ambience for such misper-
3ception, e.g. the China bloc, McCarthyism, the China 
Lobby, and the Committee of One Million. The ideological 
orthodoxy imposed upon American foreign policy through these 
influences strongly affected the subsequent blindness of many 
American professionals to the Sino-Soviet split, which is 
the subject of Chapter III. A survey will be conducted 
of professional academicians, journalists, and policymakers, 
and an attempt will be made to divide their opinions into 
schools of thought and to discern which type of professional 
best perceived the realities of the situation. These 
professional groups have been selected for study because 
they offer informed opinion that has been assumed, tradi­
tionally, to have some input in the foreign policymaking 
3
process. Chapter IV will present conclusions drawn from 
the information presented in Chapters I through III.
It is not my purpose to provide a definitive analysis 
of American China policy since World War II, the domestic 
atmosphere that helped create it, or the subsequent 
misperception of Sino-Soviet relations on the part of 
American professionals. My purpose is, rather, to 
demonstrate through a specific case.study how profoundly 
foreign policy is directed by domestic considerations-- 
considerations which ultimately rely upon'our perceptions of 
ourselves and others--perceptions that are subject to 
manipulation, coercion, and distortion.
It is the thesis of this work that American China 
policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations
between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic 
affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. This 
misperception began within ourselves and was fed, reinforced, 
and perpetuated at level after level of the policymaking 
process. It is hoped that similar mistakes can be prevented; 
but prevention cannot come about without change, and change 
is never instigated until a need for it is realized. This 
study, then, illustrates the workings of a mistake.
5NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1
I acknowledge that there are those who would argue 
that no reality exists outside one1s perception, hut 
for the purpose of this paper, we will assume that it 
does.
2 .John Stoessinger, Nations m  Darkness: China,
Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1971)» P-
3
The occupations of those professionals whose works 
will he discussed in Chapter III are crucial to the • 
conclusions drawn in this work. Biographical data appear 
in later footnotes, hut to avoid redundancy this informa­
tion will not he provided every time reference is made to 
an author. It is suggested that the reader refer to the 
chart on page 73 if he is interested in this information 
at other points in his reading. In some cases, occupa­
tional categorization is not beyond dispute, hut I con­
sider my classifications justifiable. Also, not all pro­
fessionals represented in this work are Americans. Since 
non-Americans who are known, published, and read in the 
United States unquestionably contributed to and became a 
part of American perception of the Sino-Soviet split, they 
are rightly included here.
CHAPTER I
CHINA, 1945-1972: MYTH, MISPERCEPTION, AND MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES
Long ago, in America's distant past, domestic 
affairs and foreign affairs existed as more separate 
entities than they do today. Domestic politics con­
stituted one sphere, and foreign relations another, for 
the most part. This was never a hard and fast rule, of 
course, hut the problems of one area overlapped, crisscrossed, 
or otherwise intruded into the other only infrequently.
It was, indeed, a less complex era; and it has passed.
This chapter attempts to demonstrate that American China 
policy between 19^5 and 1972 was part of a very different 
era. It was primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics, 
shaped by myth, misperception, and missed opportunities. 
Postwar changes in the foreign policymaking process contrib­
uted to the difficulty of sound policymaking, and various
elements combined to make what has been dubbed, quite
1
aptly, the "China myth."
The oldest element of this myth was the belief that
a vast market for American goods could be developed in
China, and that China, therefore, was essential to American
well-being. "China market" rhetoric flourished in such
abundance that the distinction between the potential and
6
the reality was often lost, and many Americans came to 
cherish a "market" that never actually existed.. After 
the Chinese Revolution of 19H» Americans inaccurately 
viewed China as a developing democracy; and with Chiang 
Kai-shek's rise to power, we convinced ourselves that under 
his astute leadership, China would become Christian.
(Chiang professed to be Methodist.) The dogma that 
Communism was monolithic, with all Communists working 
in concert to overthrow the world, was another element 
of the myth. This led to American misperception of 
Chinese Communism as an extension of the Soviet brand, 
while it actually represented an indigenous Chinese 
movement. Native Communism in China was something that 
we could not accept, however. It did not fit into our 
self-delusive perception of China as an oriental extension
s
of ourselves--an importer and consumer of American goods, 
a democracy, and a Christian democracy at that.
Thus, various American political groups, together with 
the Chinese Nationalists, had a fertile field for the biggest 
myth of all— the myth that somehow the United States had 
"lost" China through the Communist victory of 19^9* As 
China never belonged to us, it is difficult to.see how we 
could have "lost" it, but nevertheless the myth grew, 
fired by a neurotic fear of Communism that-was fed by 
lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians.
Included among them were the China bloc, the China 
Lobby, the Committee of One Million, and Senator Joseph 
McCarthy of Wisconsin. American policymakers, sinking
8in a mire of delusion, took the bombastic rhetoric of 
China's new leaders at face value and based policy upon 
the myth that Communist China was a dangerously expansion­
ist power. Ostrich-like, we began to claim that the 
People's Republic would expire, and we proceeded to 
formulate China policy upon that premise. American 
leaders, with vision clouded by myth and misperception, 
missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American 
relations. (Moderate elements in China had been interested 
in improving relations with the United States as late as 
June 19^9• )
The various China lobbyists wielded considerable 
clout in Washington in the late forties and early fifties 
and developed to perfection the art of manipulating 
public opinion. The Truman Administration, consciously 
concentrating upon Europe first, left itself vulnerable 
to the charges of neglect toward Asia and the "loss" of 
China. The myriad of myths, misperceptions, and missed 
opportunities that were outgrowths of this domestic 
political environment contributed to American China policy 
between 19^5 and 1972. Such were the elements of foreign 
policymaking in a government that had long outgrown the 
simple days of separation between domestic and foreign 
affairs. These elements are graphically illustrated in 
the discussion of American China policy that follows.
During the Second World War, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt maintained a strong commitment to China's being
9one of the "big four" powers, which, along with the Soviet
Union, would guarantee postwar peace. The goal, was "a
united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China
which will be capable of contributing to security and
2prosperity m  the Far East." Washington urged the 
coalition of Nationalist and Communist forces in the hope 
that the Communists could eventually be absorbed into a 
unified Chinese government. Mutual mistakes compounded 
with mistrust destroyed any hope of postwar Soviet- 
American cooperation, and events were to prove that 
Roosevelt’s dreams for China were also founded upon 
illusion.
The American Ambassador to China during the war,
Major General Patrick J. Hurley, believed that if the 
Chinese Communists were cut off from American support
s.
they would buckle under and come to terms with a coalition 
government. Neither Hurley’s staff at the Embassy nor 
the foreign service officers serving as political advisors 
to the military command accepted his estimate of Chinese 
conditions. There was agreement that policy should be 
directed toward coalition, but the career diplomats were 
convinced that the intransigence of the Kuomintang (the 
Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek) was the main 
obstacle to Chinese unity. Many officers believed that 
Hurley grossly underestimated the determination of the 
Chinese Communists. They felt that in the absence of aid 
from the United States, the Communists would be forced to 
turn to the Soviet Union for assistance, creating problems
10
3between America and Russia over China.
In January 19^5* more than four years before they 
achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou 
En-lai, the leaders of the Communist forces, offered to 
come to Washington to talk with Roosevelt in an effort 
to establish a working relationship with America. Their 
message was not forwarded, except as a secondary reference 
in another context, either to the State Department, the 
War Department, or the President. It was held up in 
Chungking by Ambassador Hurley. Consequently, the United 
States never responded to the overture.
An obvious question is whether the Chinese Communists 
were flexible enough ideologically in 19^5 to desire 
seriously an association with America. Barbara Tuchman, 
long-recognized as an astute observer of China, feels that 
they were. According to Tuchman, the Communists were, 
above all else, pragmatic. They wanted to convince the 
President that they, not the Nationalists, represented 
the future in China; they wanted recognition as a major 
party, not as an outlaw; they wanted to acquire belligerent 
status as a party to the coming Allied victory; they had 
in mind that an American connection would help them meet 
the day when the Soviets would enter Manchuria; and John 
Stewart Service, a career foreign service officer, was 
convinced that the Chinese Communists hoped to avoid an 
exclusive dependence upon the Soviet Union.^ As late 
as 19^7* 0. Edmund Clubb, the U.S. consul general in 
Peking, reported that the Communists preferred American
11
to Soviet aid: '"A future tied to the Soviet Union alone
offers them nothing hut bleak prospects in terms of 
obtaining needed industrial and consumption goods. . . .
The large stock of inspiration they get from Moscow will 
do little toward restoring China's shattered industry and 
prostrate finances.*”^
There are those who feel that American non-response 
to the 19^5 overture represented one among many missed 
opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American relations.
I, however, differ with this interpretation. United 
States Presidents do not meet with the leaders of every 
guerrilla group that threatens the security of a foreign 
nation's established government. Although Hurley cannot 
be excused for not forwarding the Communists' request to 
Washington, it is unrealistic to assume that Roosevelt 
would have or should have taken it seriously. The situation 
had changed, however, by 19^9* Uut American policy remained 
locked intractably in established patterns that had lost 
their viability.
If the Communists, nonetheless, retained hopes for 
American support, a statement by Hurley on April 2, 19^5 
severely dampened those hopes. He announced that the 
American government would support only the Kuomintang
7
regime and would not recognize or supply any other forces. 
When officers of his embassy reported accommodation to be 
less likely than he believed, Hurley charged that they 
were anti-Nationalist and were thus subverting American
12
policy. Because of his complaints, most of the foreign
service officers who understood the Chinese Communists were
transferred to positions outside China. A tragic side
effect of these transfers was the early misperception on
the part of American observers that Chinese Communism
was an extension of Soviet Communism, which it indeed was
not. It was, rather, an indigenous expression of uniquely
Chinese social problems. In fact, Sino-Soviet relations
during this period were noticeably mundane, according
to the reports of one diplomat, John F. Melby:
My primary job was to keep track of what 
the Russians were up to in China. The 
assignment was socially pleasant since 
the Soviet Ambassador was an educated, 
charming, and shy man whom I had known 
rather well in Moscow, and several mem-• 
bers of his staff were equally congenial.
But it was professionally rather nominal 
since it developed that they really were 
not up to much of anything beyond the g 
usual diplomatic routine and formalities.
Of course, it would have been possible for the Soviets
to direct activities outside of the normal diplomatic
channels, but if they did, such activities went unnoticed
and unrecorded by such astute observers of Sino-Soviet
Q
affairs as 0. Edmund Clubb.
The difficulties inherent in bringing about Nationalist- 
Communist accommodation eventually became apparent to 
Hurley, who resigned suddenly in November 19^5« He was 
unwilling, however, to accept any personal blame for his 
failure, and he left China making accusations that anti- 
Nationalists in the State Department and the China mission 
were subverting American policy. Although Hurley's
13
resignation was of minor importance when it occurred, it
was to take- on ominous significance during the ignominious
McCarthy era.
After Hurley resigned, General George C. Marshall
was sent to China to accomplish Nationalist-Communist
union through a mutually acceptable constitutional
system. He secured a truce for a short time, but the
arrangement collapsed and fighting resumed. He finally
dispaired of his tenure in China, which lasted from
December 19^5 until January 19^7* and returned to the United
States to become Secretary of State. Marshall blamed his
failure less on the Communists than on the Nationalists;
Chiang's intractability proved a constant stumbling
block. But despite these difficulties, a high-level
consensus emerged that America should back non-Communists
10in China against the Communist opponents.
Marshall supported a non-Communist solution to problems
in China, but because of his 19^5-19^7 experience, he had
doubts as to whether the United States should support the
Nationalists. Marshall's replacement in the China post,
John Leighton Stuart, also acknowledged the defects of
the Nationalists'regime, but he had a strong affection
for Chiang and believed that the United States should
guarantee his survival. Like so many others, Stuart
believed that the Gommunists were authoritarian dupes of
Moscow, and that sufficient American aid to the Nationalists
11could secure the latter's success.
14
Discussion of American China policy in the late 
1940*s cannot take place as if it existed in a vacuum. 
Policy vis-a-vis one nation evolves concurrently with 
domestic politics and a global ambience, and in 1947* 
the Truman Administration was occupied with issues that 
outweighed the China problem. In March, the Truman 
Doctrine requesting immediate aid to Greece and Turkey 
was announced, and the Marshall Plan followed in June. 
Implicit in both was the overriding importance of Europe 
to American security and economic well-being, with Asia 
being of lesser significance. China policy was being 
reconsidered by the Administration during this period, 
but in a context of secondary importance.
In June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that 
the United States reverse its policy of official non­
interference in the Chinese civil war.^ As part of this 
reappraisal of China policy, and in an effort to placate 
domestic elements that wanted increased aid to Chiang, 
Marshall sent General Arthur Wedemeyer to China to evaluate 
the situation. Accompanied by a small staff, Wedemeyer 
toured China for a month, visiting the Nationalist 
capital, Formosa, Canton, Shanghai, and areas in the north 
and northeast. He delivered his report of the mission 
to Marshall and the President on September 19» 1947. 
Wedemeyer recommended considerable military and economic 
aid, contingent upon Chiang's agreement to carry out 
sweeping reforms. He also suggested that United Nations
15
action be taken in Manchuria to relieve Chiang of the
13
responsibility of maintaining that area.
Truman and Marshall did not consider East Asia 
sufficiently important to American security to warrant 
such measures. They were convinced that security dollars 
would provide infinitely greater returns when invested 
in Europe. This was not publicly disclosed, however, and 
the Administration decided to suppress the Wedemeyer 
report, leaving itself susceptible to charges of deceit 
that eventually followed.
Truman and his advisors realized their vulnerability 
on the China issue; they took a calculated political risk 
and allowed the public to remain in the dark on China.
A full-scale educational campaign explaining the primary 
role of Europe to American security could have been
s
launched, but the Administration realized that the Repub­
licans could have turned the former’s own argument 
against them, asking why the same logic would not apply 
to Asia. If a non-Communist Europe was essential to 
American security, was not a non-Communist Asia just as 
important? This was one political gamble whose conse­
quences reverbated throughout the next quarter century, 
and it serves to illustrate that domestic politics and 
foreign affairs were not,separate entities in the forties, 
but were entwined intricately; thus they remain today.
The decision against intervention in China was con­
veyed to Congress in February 19^8, but pro-Chiang pressure 
continued from some in the diplomatic and military missions,
16
the military establishment in Washington, the China bloc,
and the China Lobby.
Perhaps definitions of the China bloc and the China
Lobby would be helpful at this point. The China bloc
was not a formally organized group; it was, rather, an
amorphous body of congressmen, the numbers of which changed
from time to time. What did not change was that they
consistently demanded greater support for the Nationalists.
With the exceptions of Pat McCarran of Nevada and James
Eastland of Mississippi, who were Democrats, these congress-
14’men were very conservative Republicans. Pro-Chiang 
senators, in addition to Eastland and McCarran, included 
Owen Brewster (Republican, Maine), Styles Bridges (Repub­
lican, New Hampshire), Harry Cain (Republican, New Jersey), 
Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan), Joseph McCarthy 
(Republican, Wisconsin), and Alexander Smith (Republican,
New Jersey). Pro-Nationalist members of the House of 
Representatives were 0. K. Armstrong (Republican, Missouri), 
Walter Judd (Republican, Minnesota), Joseph Martin, Jr.
(Republican, Massachusetts), Lawrence Smith (Republican,
15Wisconsin), and John Vorys (Republican, Ohio). This 
group was almost pathologically alarmed by what they saw 
as a monolithic conspiratorial force, directed by the 
Soviet Union, with the aim of suppressing liberty every­
where, overthrowing, free enterprise, and "burying” the
16United States.
The China Lobby, which should not be confused with 
the congressional China bloc, consisted of an inner core
*7
of well-financed Nationalist Chinese officials and 
supportive right-wing Americans. It worked through many 
variegated organizations and publications. Among them 
were the Universal Trading Corporation, the Chinese Oil 
Corporation, Commerce International Corporation, 
the American Technical and Military Advisory Group to the 
Chinese Government, the American China Policy Association, 
the China Emergency Committee, the Committee to Defend America 
by Aiding Anti-Communist China, the Committee for Consti­
tutional Government, "America's Future, Inc.," The China 
Monthly, and Plain Talk. These groups were formulated 
specifically as branches of the China Lobby, but several 
long-standing American publications supported the National­
ist Chinese and their views. Among them were Collier*s , 
the Saturday Evening Post, Human Events, American Mercury, 
Reader's Digest. U.S. News & World Report, The New Leader, 
and Life. Outstanding among pro-Chiang newspapers were 
the New York Journal-American, the Washington Times-Herald, 
the Examiner (both Los Angeles and San Francisco), the
Oakland Tribune, and the Manchester, New Hampshire, Union 
17Leader. Both the China bloc and the China Lobby will be 
discussed at greater length in Chapter II.
During the debates over the Marshall Plan, China 
lobbyists attempted to add aid to Chiang to the appropri­
ations for the European Recovery Program. What emerged 
was a compromise--the China Aid Act of April 1948--which 
was tacked onto the Foreign Assistance Act. It provided for 
$338,000,000 in direct economic aid and $125*000,000 in
military assistance for one year. This, in reality was merely 
a sop to the China lobbyists, as the Truman Administration 
had already decided that the internal conditions in China 
were such that large-scale intervention would be imprudent.
As Senator Yandenberg later said, the China Aid Act amounted 
to no more than "three cheers for Chiang Kai-shek." The aid 
did not reach Chiang in time, and whether it would have done 
any good if it had is questionable. In October 19^9* ihe Com­
munists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and in De-
11cember, Chiang and what was left of his forces fled to Formosa. '
Although debate raged for a decade about what should have
been done, real debate about whether to intervene militarily
in China stretched only over the year from Spring 1947 to
Winter 1947-48. American options during this period were
to try to save Chiang by exorbitant military aid and advice,
or to bend to China's indigenous realities. The second
option was followed, and as" Dean Acheson explained in his
introduction to the China White Paper, "the unfortunate but
inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war
in China was beyond the control of the government of the United
19States . . . .  It was the product of internal Chinese forces." • 
It is an irony of history that the Truman Administra­
tion considered an explanation of the difference between 
areas of vital concern to the United States and areas of 
peripheral concern too subtle for the understanding of the 
American public. As has been mentioned, such an explana­
tion could have been attacked by political opponents, but 
left unexplained by the Administration, the issue was to
19
become potent ammunition in the argument of China lobbyists 
for the "loss" of China through internal betrayal.
There are those who feel that before the Korean War
the Truman Administration was consciously withholding
recognition and attempting to isolate the new Communist
regime only as a tactic to force the Chinese to live up
to its definition of proper international obligations. If
those obligations had been met, the Administration would
probably have extended recognition, as it wanted to
encourage Titoism in China and to promote a rift in Sino-
20Soviet relations. Whether the Administration considered 
recognition to be a viable policy option is questionable, 
but it was certainly discussed--a fact that was repeatedly 
denied during the McCarthy witch hunts when it meant 
professional suicide to admit that one's understanding
of international relations went beyond the orthodoxy of
. 21 paranoia.
Moderate elements in China showed interest in American
22recognition as late as June 19^9» but after that time, 
the United States had missed its chance with the People's 
Republic. From then on, the more radical anti-American 
forces in China had gained the upper hand, and the Chinese 
Communists
were the badge of Communist orthodoxy and 
were openly committed to a pro-Soviet 
policy. The United States, by siding 
with the Nationalists in the civil war, 
had helped to - solidify the Communists 
in that position . . . .  In his speech 
of July 1, 19^9i Mao Tse-tung had re­
vealed the key to his strategy. China,
20
he said, could not look to imperialist 
powers for help; only the revolutionary 
Soviet Union would be prepared to provide 
the assistance that would make China's 
sinews strong. Consequently, China would 
lean to the side of the Soviet Union.
On January 5, 1950, Truman announced a policy of 
non-support for the Nationalists in the Chinese civil 
strife, and Acheson added that this was proof to the world 
that America would not meddle in internal Chinese affairs. 
With Chinese Communist entrance into the Korean War in 
November, however, Truman reversed this nascent policy.
The United States became solidified in opposition to 
the Chinese Communists and in containment of Communism in 
Asia as well as in Europe.
This represented a watershed in American foreign 
policy that set the United States on a course not to be 
reversed until - Richard Nixon visited the People's Republic 
in 1972. China was added to the ranks of the Soviet Union 
as enemy- of the United States.
Sadly, this policy, which was to span a quarter of 
the twentieth century, was founded upon a number of 
underlying myths. Primary among them was the assumption 
that Communist China was the obedient tool of Moscow.
This stemmed from the dogma that all Communist governments 
were united in an unswerving determination to conquer the 
world. Titoism revealed a fissure in what was believed 
to be an invincible monolith, but it was ignored, as was
pit,
the subsequent Sino-Soviet split for so many years.
Rather than watching China's actions, America listened to
21
its rhetoric and assumed that it was expansionist. We 
also buried our heads in the sand and based policy upon 
the wishful thought that the People's Republic would expire. 
These were the immediate elements of the myth, but under­
lying them were beliefs that had been internalized by 
American policymakers and cognizant elements of the 
public— beliefs that took a quarter of a century to erode.
It was felt that China, after the Revolution of 1911,
had been a developing democracy that could become Christian
under Chiang, who was China's undisputed leader. China was
our ward, and a ward that represented an almost infinite
25market for American exports. Such an ambience was 
fertile ground for the growth of another myth— the myth 
that we had "lost" China, as if China had ever been ours 
to lose in the first place.
The decade that followed Truman's decision to reinvolve 
America in Chinese affairs witnessed the further development 
and hardening of anti-Chinese attitudes. The administration 
of Dwight David Eisenhower tolerated and abetted the McCarthy­
ite emasculation of the State Department; and Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles convinced himself of the im­
morality of all Communists, neutralists,, and Chinese 
Communists in particular. Having promised in 1952 that 
he would end the neglect of the Far East, Dulles tried to 
isolate, encircle, and bring about the collapse of the 
Peking government. The United States would recognize no 
China but the Republic of China.
The Eisenhower Administration used political, economic,
22
and military ammunition against the Chinese Communist regime. 
American bases were- developed rapidly in East Asia, and 
mutual defense treaties were signed with those Asian states 
willing to make anti-Communist professions. As Stalin's
quest for security in Europe had stiffened Western 
resistance and had helped effect the very military encircle­
ment he feared, by the same token, China's intervention 
in the Korean War produced a more threatening military 
posture by the United States. Of all alliances, however,
it was the American relationship with Taiwan that most
27exacerbated Sino-American relations.
When Peking's forces threatened the islands of Matsu
and Quemoy in 195^ and 1958, the United States provided
Chiang with the logistical support necessary to hold them.
And in May 1957* America and the Nationalists announced
that missiles capable of carrying conventional or nuclear
warheads were being based on Taiwan for the purpose of
28deterring attack and repelling it if necessary.
John Fitzgerald Kennedy took the reins of the American 
government in’ l'96l, and his years in office were marked by 
dangerous adventurism vis-a-vis Asia. While the Administra­
tion worked toward a detente with the Soviet Union, which
it was slowly coming to see as a status quo power, it
29retained its Cold War posture in Asia.
In the years immediately following Kennedy's assassina­
tion in 1963» President Lyndon Baines Johnson strove to 
improve Soviet-American relations, and some began to speak 
of the end of the Cold War. Progress toward China, however,
23
came more slowly. American China policy was intended to be
two prongeds to simultaneously reduce tensions and to
demonstrate American determination to stand firmly against
Chinese aggression. The policy was known as "containment
30without isolation.'
Regrettably, Johnson perpetuated Kennedy's decision
to draw the line on Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam. No
one seemed to notice that the Chinese had much less to do
with the Vietnamese struggle than they claimed--"that
Vietnamese Communism was no more an extension of Chinese
31power than Chinese Communism was of Russian power.
In the muddy morass of Southeast Asia, the quest for normal­
ized relations with China bogged down.
Richard Milhous Nixon became President of the United 
States in 19^9* and slowly, a series of actions indicated 
his desire to improve relations 'with China. Travel and 
trade restrictions were eased and the Seventh Fleet's 
mission in the Formosa Straits was brought to an end.
Finally, in February 1972, the first United States
32President in history visited China. America was coming 
to deal with the Dragon as pragmatically as it dealt with 
the. Bear.
The events that occur are essential information for 
anyone who seeks to understand American foreign policy, 
but just as important is a basic knowledge of how policy 
is made. The Second World War brought with, it a revolution 
in the foreign policymaking process. New instruments and
zh
agencies became integral parts of international relations: 
foreign aid, increasingly complex trade and monetary 
arrangements, intelligence gathering and evaluation, under­
cover activities, propaganda transmission, the United 
Nations and its subsidiary organizations, arms control 
and weapons technology, and military planning and operations. 
The State Department concurrently mushroomed into a huge 
bureaucracy and lost its dominant role in the conduct of 
foreign policy. The Department of Defense developed an 
international affairs component parallel to and often more 
influential than the Department of State, and from Dulles’ 
death in 1959 until Kissinger’s assumption of the role, the 
Secretary of State ceased to be an officer of first importance 
for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Secretary and his 
Department were overshadowed by special advisers to the 
President and their staffs--McGeorge Bundy for Kennedy,
Walt Rostow for Johnson, and Henry Kissinger for Nixon,
33until Kissinger became Secretary of State. ^
These special advisers, or national security managers, 
were forced by the nature of their jobs to be generalists.
To serve the President and keep his confidence, which was 
the only source of their power, they had to be prepared to 
commit themselves to any crisis wherever it occurred. They 
had to relate the rush of events into a coherent pattern 
that the President could understand. This meant that 
facts had to be shoved into available theories in which 
bureaucracies had big investments. Obscure events required 
location in a familiar ideological landscape. Because of
25
such a policymaking apparatus, planners were still talking 
about the Sino-Soviet bloc for years after the split in 
the Communist alliance had exploded into public view. The 
global manager could not afford to compromise his ideology 
with contradictory facts, for his reputation rested on
3A
being able to manipulate events according to a theory.
The role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy 
or in being manipulated to advance foreign policy objectives 
became more controversial and complex. National security 
managers understood that public outcries and threat of 
punishment at the polls did not come from spontaneous 
reaction to national security decisions but from political 
exploitation of these decisions by skillful adversaries—  
a China Lobby with sufficient money to haunt every office 
in Congress, a demagogue with enough appeal to tag an 
Administration with the "loss of China" or with "twenty 
years of treason." ^ In short, the boundaries between 
domestic affairs and foreign affairs, never sharp even 
in the simplest times, disappeared completely after
1 9 4 5 .36
This crumbling of traditional boundaries, tenuous 
as those boundaries may have been, profoundly affected 
American China policy between 19^5 and 1972, which was 
primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics, shaped by 
myth, misperception, and missed opportunities. Elements 
of the domestic political scene in the U.S., including 
tenacious lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians
26
such as the China bloc, the China Lobby, the Committee 
of One Million, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, attacked 
the Europe-oriented Truman Administration where it was 
most vulnerable and charged it before the American 
public with the "loss" of a potentially Christian, 
democratic China— a China with a large market for Ameri­
can goods. This mythical portrait was compounded by the 
misperception that the People’s Republic was a dangerous, 
expansionist power on the verge of expiration. Adhering 
to such myths and misperceptions, American policymakers 
missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American 
relations (e.g. American failure to court moderate 
elements in China in the spring of 19^9)» and postwar 
American China policy became locked into unreasonable
7
postures. The rise of the national security managers 
and the concurrent decline in the importance of the 
State Department added to the paucity of China policy 
between 19^5 and 1972.
Elements of the American domestic political scene 
such as the various China lobbyists, McCarthy, and the 
transformed foreign policymaking bureaucracy affected 
much more than American relations with the People’s 
Republic of China, however. The mistake was much 
bigger than that. In Chapter II we will investigate 
how these elements affected the domestic intellectual and 
political environments; and Chapter III will deal with how 
they contributed to misperception of the Sino-Soviet split 
on the part of three American professional groups.
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CHAPTER II 
CREATION OF ORTHODOXY:
THE CHINA BLOC, THE CHINA LOBBY,
THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION, AND JOSEPH MCCARTHY
The 19^0's and 1950's were a time of tremendous 
strain in American politics. They were wracked with 
the harsh realities of a World War, an incipient Cold 
War, Communist victory in China, and the Korean War.
To these international strains were added the disruptive 
tensions that exploded in McCarthyism at home.
The American public's reaction to these events was 
confused and befuddled, especially concerning events in 
China. Americans had long thought of themselves as the 
protectors and benefactors of the Chinese, and what they 
knew of realities in China was nebulous at best. They 
were unable to believe that the Chinese would substitute one 
form of government for another without some form of American 
consultation. It was a simple step from such an attitude 
ijo the conviction that American policy had been designed 
intentionally to hand China to the Communists.
This attitude among the population provided fertile 
ground for the congressional China bloc and the China 
Lobby. These groups worked together in the forties and
30
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fifties to support Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung, 
and to discredit anyone and anything that could be construed 
as opposition to Chiang. Before Mao's success in 19^9> 
their primary objective was to obtain increased aid for 
the Nationalists, who were led, of course, by Chiang Kai-shek. 
This necessitated stressing the importance of Nationalist 
China to American security. After 19^9* primary attention 
was given to preventing American recognition of the People's 
Republic of China and blocking its admission to the United 
Nations. The China Lobby and the China bloc were joined, 
in 1950, by the junior senator from Wisconsin, Joseph 
McCarthy. Another group, the Committee of One Million, 
carried the China Lobby's mantle through the 1960's.
In pursuance of their objectives, the groups listed 
above became catalysts for defining anti-Communism, pushing 
American political thought and action to the right, and 
restricting the scholar of Asian studies to apolitical 
scholarship. During the process, reputable Asia specialists 
in the government, academia, and journalism were discredited, 
and American foreign policy was frozen unrealistically by 
the silencing of rational and informed dissent. It should 
be remembered, however, that none of this could have been 
accomplished without the receptivity of the American 
people.^
Many issues were exploited by the China bloc, the 
China Lobby, McCarthy, and later the Committee of One 
Million in pursuit of their objectives, but seven events 
were most salient. Major exploitation of these events
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occurred after the Communist victory in China in 19^9* 
which in several cases was a number of years after the 
events had taken place. These seven events were the 
Yalta agreement, the Amerasia affair, the resignation of 
Patrick Hurley, the failure of the Marshall mission, 
the "spy ring" revelations of the ex-Communists, the 
conviction of Alger Hiss, and the war m  Korea.
How these events were exploited is a long and involved 
story that is secondary to our purpose. What is central 
is that we gain some understanding of the effect of the 
gradual acceptance of a well-defined propaganda line,
i.e., that China had been essential to American national 
security; that it was "lost" as the result of deliberate 
treachery by various private Asia specialists and State 
Department officials; and that further damage had to be 
prevented by non-recognition of the People's Republic 
of China and its exclusion from the United Nations. The 
evolution of this line into American political orthodoxy 
affected non-governmental American Asia specialists 
including academicians, journalists, and scholarly organiza­
tions and foundations. It also affected governmental 
specialists, most of whom were State Department employees.
American Asia specialists, who were few in number in the 
19^0's and '50's, tended to be divided into two schools of 
opinion.-^ One group was interested in the more traditional China 
of the Christian missions, the treaty ports, and the Kuomin- 
tang, as they were most familiar with those elements of
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Chinese society which had absorbed Western ways. They 
believed that Chiang Kai-shek could retain control of 
China with only a minimum of help from the United States, 
and that he represented democratic forces in the American 
sense. The victory of these democratic forces would result 
in a China which would be anti-Soviet and pro-American.
The group as a whole believed that all Communists were 
tools of Moscow, and were, therefore, in conflict with 
America. They tended to reduce all foreign policy questions 
to a problem of Communism versus anti-Communism, a problem 
which they saw as essentially one of morality rather than 
one of power. Among American military personnel, adherents 
to this school of opinion included General Claire Lee 
Chennault, General Douglas MacArthur, Major General 
Patrick J. Hurley, and Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger.
Those of the second school of opinion placed greater 
emphasis upon revolutionary China. Where the first group 
concentrated their attention upon'those who were in power, 
the second focused upon their opponents. They either 
supported the policy of noninvolvement that America had 
at least partially attempted toward China after 19^5* or 
they criticized that policy on the basis that it was tied 
too intimately to Chiang. The most important question for 
this group was not which Chinese forces were more pro- 
American, but which were more likely to win. These 
specialists believed that the Communists would probably 
control Chinab future, and that the United States should 
not, therefore, alienate them. Military supporters of
3^
this view included General Joseph’ W. Stilwell, General 
George C. Marshall, and Major General David G. Barr.
No civilian government specialists appear to have 
adopted the view of the first group after 19^5 * On 
the other hand, a long list supported the second position. 
Among them were John Carter Vincent, John P. Davies, Jr.:, 
John S. Service, and Oliver Edmund Clubb.
The overwhelming majority of civilian specialists 
in non-governmental positions supported the view that 
Chiang would lose if left to run things his way, and that 
he should be forced to meet American conditions for aid. 
Indeed, this was the prevailing view between 1 9 ^  and 19^9* 
Adherents included such academicians as John King Fair- 
bank, Nathaniel Peffer, Owen Lattimore, Lawrence Rosinger, 
T. A. Bisson, Berk Bodde, Harold M. Vinacke, Charles P. 
Fitzgerald, Benjamin Schwartz, Kenneth Latourette, William 
Johnstone, W. W. Lockwood, and Dorothy Borg.
After the Communist victory in China, a few academic 
specialists began to voice the argument that those special­
ists who had expressed a belief in the ultimate triumph 
of the Communists had actually contributed, by such 
expression, to the Communist victory. Some of them also 
argued that such specialists were either pro-Communist 
or the Communists* dupes. The most prominent members 
of this group were David Rowe, William McGovern, Karl 
Wittfogel, Kenneth Colegrove, and George E. Taylor.
These views were largely unpublicized until after the 
Communist victory, though they may have been held before
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then. This early silence meant, in practice, that the 
government, news media, and scholarly organizations came to 
be dominated in the period from 19^  to 19^9 by those who 
adhered to the Stilwell view.
Under such circumstances, it was necessary for the 
pro-Nationalist spokesmen to discredit the prevailing 
school of thought. Asia specialists’ reputations were 
called into question through repeated accusations of 
"Communist connections." In other words, the attack on 
American policy toward China was accompanied from the 
beginning by direct, personal attacks upon anti-Chiang 
specialists.
One of the earliest of these attacks came in 1 9 ^  
when G. Barry O ’Toole accused an academic Asia specialist, 
Nathaniel Peffer, of having rehashed "’in meticulous 
detail all the standard lies devised by Red propaganda 
and all the misleading half-truths urged by unintelligent 
American criticism.'"^
A new element joined the pro-Nationalist spokesmen 
in 1950. The China bloc had spearheaded the main assault 
against the Truman Administration’s effort to develop a 
viable China policy in the winter of 19^9-50, but when 
Senator Joseph McCarthy entered the scene on February 9»
1950 with his charges of Communism in the Department of 
State, he gave both new direction and new intensity to the 
attacks of the China bloc and China Lobby on the Truman- 
Acheson Far Eastern policy. His speech at Wheeling,
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West Virginia, in which he told the members of the local 
Women's Republican Club that he had a list of 205 persons 
in the State Department known to the Secretary of State 
as Communists and still shaping foreign policy, was to 
have fateful consequences. Earlier charges of Administra­
tion appeasement- in Asia were transmuted under McCarthy's 
influence to accusations that policy was the result of a 
pro-Communist conspiracy in Washington. McCarthy had 
seen a chance to build his own political future by playing
upon the public's anxieties, and he pursued this chance
7with callous disregard for truth or consequences.
In the spring of 1950, the disruptive effects of 
McCarthyism could be seen everywhere, but the greatest 
impact was on the conduct of Far Eastern policy. Moves 
to cleanse the Far Eastern Division of the State Department 
had been initiated as a result of General Hurley's charges 
before McCarthy came on the scene. Among the more 
important persons transferred during this first period 
were John Paton Davies, advisor to Stilwell at Kunming;
John Carter Vincent, counselor at the embassy-at Chung­
king and later head of the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs; and John S. Service, third secretary at Chungking. 
Their error, in each case, was reporting the weakness of
the Nationalists and the mounting strength of the Commun-
. . 8 ists.
When McCarthy launched his attacks, he made no 
direct charges against Davies but specifically singled 
out Service and Vincent as being pro-Communist. Both
37
men were cleared after a series of investigations and 
loyalty reviews, but pressure was too great to allow them 
to remain in the Department. Service and Vincent were 
ousted in 1951» and 0. Edmund Clubb followed in 1952.
Davies was fired in 195^- With Davies’ departure, not a 
single experienced China specialist remained in the Depart­
ment on the policymaking level. No better example could 
be found of the oppressive hand of McCarthyism on the 
operations of the State Department than the loss of such
men, against whom no valid evidence of Communist sympathies
9
was ever produced.
Another consequence of McCarthyism was the suppression 
of objective reporting on China by the best-informed 
observers in the journalistic and academic worlds. Their 
mistake was that they agreed with State Department specialists 
on the bankruptcy of the Nationalist regime, the futility 
of extending aid to Chiang, and the advisability of 
complete disengagement from the civil war in China.
These China experts included such scholars and 
journalists as Owen Lattimore, John King Fairbank, Edgar 
Snow, Nathaniel Peffer (who had come under attack as 
early as 19^4), Joseph Barnes, Harold Isaacs, and T. A.
Bisson. In a study published in I96I , Robert Newman 
reported that between 19^5 and 1950 the above group of 
writers had reviewed in the New York Times twenty-two 
of thirty books dealing with China, and in the Herald 
Tribune, thirty out of thirty-five. Between 1952 and 1956, 
however, none of them appeared in the book review pages
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of either newspaper.^
The restraints imposed on these writers left an 
open field for right-wing publicists such as John Flynn, 
Felix Wittmer, and Freda Utley to shape opinion according 
to their views. The virtual suppression of factual 
reporting on the Far East greatly widened the ever­
present gap between myth and reality in both official
11and popular understanding of China.
The attack upon Owen Lattimore is an outstanding
example of what happened to non-governmental Asia special-
12ists during this infamous period of American history. 
Lattimore had come under serious public scrutiny in an 
article by Alfred Kohlberg published in October 19^5*
He remained under constant attack for almost five years in
\
media ranging from Columbia (a publication of the Knights 
of Columbus), to the floor of the United States Senate. 
Finally, in March 1950, Senator McCarthy presented in the 
Senate chamber a resume of all of Kohlberg's attacks on 
Lattimore. These charges made bold headlines across the 
country and focused extensive public attention upon the 
scholar.
Subsequent to McCarthy's charges, a long series of 
hearings was held by the Tydings Committee, a subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Two former 
Communists, Freda Utley and Louis Budenz, added to McCarthy's 
charges. Budenz accused Lattimore of being a member of 
a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations
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and suggested that he was a sinister architect of Far 
Eastern policy and even a Russian spy.
The majority of the subcommittee rejected the testimony 
and its implications. They concluded that Lattimore was 
no spy, that there was nothing to support the charge that 
he was a Communist, and that his influence on American 
Far Eastern policy had been no greater than that of hundreds 
of other specialists who voiced opinions.
In July 1951» however, the Internal Security Subcommittee 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, under Senator McCarran 
as chairman, began an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific 
Relations that again centered on Lattimore. As a result 
of these hearings, the subcommittee concluded that 
”'Lattimore was for some time, beginning in the middle
1930's, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet
, lf 13conspiracy.'"
As a result of these hearings, Lattimore endured, 
almost three years of litigation on charges of perjury 
resulting from statements made during the subcommittee 
investigations. He was not convicted and was legally 
vindicated, but his scholarly reputation was devastated 
by the fact that those accusations had been sanctioned 
by the United States Senate. In addition, the mere 
mention that any Asia specialist had been in any way 
associated with Lattimore was enough to cast doubt on 
that specialist's integrity.
Thus, one of the effects of McCarthyism was the destruc­
tion of the reputations and influence of many of the most
^0
prominent non-governmental Asia specialists in America.
These effects also extended to the organizational frame­
work within which Asia specialists functioned and through 
which their knowledge was channeled. The Institute of 
Pacific Relations, for example, was shrouded with such
lksuspicion that it was forced to fold for lack of funds.
A source from which McCarthy drew much of his informa­
tion and which proved to, be a disturbing influence on 
policy was the vague entity that came to be known as the 
China Lobby. Not to be confused with the congressional 
China bloc, although often in close association with it, 
the China Lobby was composed of officials from the National­
ist embassy in Washington, their paid propaganda agents, and 
many rabid anti-Communists drawn from the ranks of American 
businessmen, retired Army officers, and conservative State
Department specialists. Alfred Kohlberg, a businessman,
1 <
was the Lobby's most direct link with Senator McCarthy. ^
The China Lobby as it was originally constituted 
eventually faded away. Its place was taken by a group 
initially called the Committee for One Million Against 
the Admission of Communist China into the United Nations.
It sprang from a movement on the part of pro-Nationalists 
to block what for a time appeared to be a possibility 
that America would reverse its position on the representa­
tion issue. Having succeeded in its goal in 1953» the 
original Committee disbanded and reorganized as the 
Committee of One Million to throw its influence behind a 
broader campaign to ensure the complete political isolation
^1
of the People's Republic of China.
In 1966, the Committee enrolled on its list no less 
than 33^ members of Congress. Marvin Liebman, its secretary, 
stated that the Committee's purpose was to arouse congression­
al and public opinion against the admission of Communist 
China to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, and 
trade relations.^
It is impossible to unravel the threads that bound 
together the congressional China bloc, the China Lobby,
Senator Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One 
Million. They worked separately as well as together.
Yet always in the background was the same hard core of 
anti-Communists who remained convinced that American 
policy should be to support Chiang and make no concessions 
to Mao.
The total effects of these combined groups upon 
American domestic and foreign affairs would be impossible 
to measure, but some generalizations can be made. The 
dismissal of such dissenters as Davies, Clubb, Service, 
and Vincent from the Department of State made the risks 
of informed criticism far too great for the majority of 
officials. For the most part, such criticism ceased, 
eliminating intelligent debate as a part of the policy­
making process. The discrediting of Lattimore and others
17pushed Asia scholars into conservatism. Until very 
recently, few scholars of Asia cared to remind their 
classes, or themselves, that the scholarly work being 
done was largely the produce of men who had either survived
kz
or missed a purge. With few exceptions, only two kinds 
of China specialists survived: the cold warriors
who believed in an international Communist conspiracy, and 
those who retreated into a limbo where value-free truth
18was always equidistant between any two current extremes.
The institutional framework through which non-governmental 
specialists worked was damaged. Journalists were also affected. 
Theodore White did not write on China for a long while.
Edgar Snow continued to write, but from a base in Switzer­
land rather than the United States. The quality of 
material on China fell off dramatically, partially because 
of the silence of those who had previously dominated the
field and partially because of the wall which separated
i q
the United States from China. 7 In short, the Cold War 
ethic was internalized by an entire nation, and a 
political orthodoxy was created.
The propaganda of the China bloc, the China Lobby, 
the Committee of One Million, and- Senator Joseph McCarthy 
triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception.
An atmosphere of paranoia was created in the United 
States, and this atmosphere unquestionably carried over 
into American foreign policy. It was in such an ambience 
that discussion of the Sino-Soviet antagonisms first began, 
and it was this Cold War intellectual and political 
environment that directed and for many years confined 
the perception of the Sino-Soviet split that is the
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subject of Chapter III.
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^ Ibid. , p. 88.
^ Ibid., pp. 88-89.
17This opinion, expressed by Richard Kagan in his 
Introduction to The China Lobby in American Politics, 
supports the contention I originally made in 1973» and 
that appears in this work in the conclusion, that China 
scholars were hampered by fear of censure in expressing 
their perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split.
^Orville Schell, "Melby: The Mandate of Heaven,"
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 1 (January 1970): 
5^-58.
^^Sandra Hawley, "The China Myth at Mid-Century" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University,
1973), p. 28^.
CHAPTER I I I
AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT:
1956-1972
We have seen that foreign policy between 19^5 and 
1972 was very different from what it had been before 
the Second World War. Any separation of foreign and 
domestic affairs had totally disappeared, and the national 
security advisor, whose power came directly from the 
President and was subject to his whim, had greatly 
displaced the traditional power of State Department 
personnel. Myth and misperception combined with missed 
opportunities to freeze American policy toward China 
in an unrealistic mold. Although the Chinese Communists 
had been interested in improving relations with the 
United States as late as June l9^5f we ignored them, 
and with the help of propaganda bombardment from the 
China bloc, the China Lobby, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, 
we came to believe what we were predisposed to believe—  
that the United States had "lost" a potentially Christian, 
democratic China— a China with a tremendous market for 
American goods. This loss, we believed, was designed 
and carried out by Communist sympathizers in the United 
States whose positions varied from State Department 
officials, to academic Asia specialists, to newspaper
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reporters. The beautiful China these traitors had 
caused us to lose had been transformed into an expansion­
ist Communist Dragon--the puppet on a string held in 
Moscow. And the Soviet Union and the People*s Republic 
of China, or Red China, as we called it, were united in 
blissful agreement to overthrow the world.
Such was the political and intellectual environment 
of the United States by the mid-1950*s. Informed dissent 
to orthodoxy was mute; dissent was un-American. None­
theless, that orthodoxy was wrong. In the following 
pages, we'will discuss the factors which did indeed 
contribute to a giant fissure in the Sino-Soviet monolith, 
the events of the fissure's history, and the perception 
of the split by three groups of American professionals. 
What we will find should not be surprising to the reader 
who has gone with us thus far, but this study is no 
less disturbing because its results can be anticipated 
partially. After all, we are discussing years of ill- 
conceived policy toward major world powers. We are 
discussing a mistake whose reverbations we still feel.
Most informed observers of Sino-Soviet affairs date 
the beginning of serious antagonisms between the two 
Communist giants from Khrushchev's secret speech at the 
Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 
February 1956. We will look at the publications and 
public statements of academicians, journalists, and
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policymakers dealing with the rift between 1956 and 
1972 when the Sino-American rapproachment radically 
altered the balance of world power. These professional 
groups have been selected for study because they offer 
informed opinion that has been assumed, traditionally, 
to have some input in the foreign policymaking process.
It would help our understanding of professional 
perception of the split if we had some idea of what 
contributed to the conflict between the two countries. 
There were many factors. The firs't and most important 
was a long history of hatred and mistrust. In addition, 
each country felt that the other was a corruptor of 
Marxism. The Russians resented Mao's claim that he was 
the Asian Marx and his egocentric desire to go down in 
history as one of the prophets of Communism rather than 
one of its disciples. The Russian elevation of Lenin 
could hardly be considered less egocentric, however. 
Differences in the political environments of Communist 
China and Communist Russia also gave rise to divergence 
of outlook. The sense of apprehension on the part of 
Chinese Communist leaders because of the existence of 
the Taiwan regime was significant. Some, scholars would 
argue that there was no parallel to this in the Soviet 
environment, and that much of Chinese Communist militancy 
could be attributed to fear of an East-West detente at 
China's expense. Another factor in the conflict was 
economic. The Soviet Union was becoming a "have"
nation while China remained a "have not" nation. A
military element was also salient. As the Chinese
Communists had no atomic or nuclear weapons until 1964,
they had to rely upon Soviet military power which was
not always at Chinese disposal. Still another factor
that contributed to differences between the two countries
might be called their separate revolutionary interests.
In the perspective of both countries, the world was in
revolutionary ferment and ultimately destined to become
Communist, but in hastening this process, differences of
priority, of sectionalism, and of timing arose. For
example, for Khrushchev to have split DeGaulle away
from the Western alliance would have been a bigger
prize than a Communist Algeria, but for Mao, a Chinese-
supported Algerian insurrection seemed to be the gateway
to North Africa.^
Just as important as the factors contributing to
the split were the events which made its history.. It
has been said that "the three years from Stalin's death
until the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress
in February 1956 was the only real period of friendship
3between the Russians and the Chinese." Khrushchev's
speech at the congress denouncing Stalin's "cult of
personality" was the opening salvo of what was to become
a mighty feud. Resentful of Khrushchev's failure to
consult them before launching this attack, the Chinese
4subsequently raised the issue of polycentrism. Although
the dispute evolved privately for some time, points of 
difference apparently arose even during the days of 
maximum collaboration. Signs of discord were discernible 
in 1958, but special knowledge of Communist jargon was 
required to detect them. The first open indication of 
antagonism came in April i960 with the Chinese publica­
tion of a three-part article commemorating Lenin.^ It 
argued that an unnamed but clearly indicated Soviet 
leadership had betrayed Leninism, and the Soviets responded 
with articles attacking Chinese positions. Once in the 
open, the controversy mushroomed. Both Chinese and 
Soviet spokesmen sought support among other Communist 
parties, and in August i960 the Soviets applied an 
economic squeeze on the Chinese by withdrawing all Soviet 
technicians from China. The situation was made even
s
more difficult for the Chinese by the fact that the 
Russian technicians took all of their blueprints with 
them. In the autumn of 196'lf Khrushchev openly denounced 
Peking's principal supporter, the leadership of the 
Albanian Communist Party, accusing them of "errors" 
committed by the Chinese. In 1962, the two countries 
clashed bitterly over the handling of the Cuban missile 
crisis and the Chinese attack on India. Peking began 
criticizing Khrushchev by name in I963, which may have 
contributed to his ouster in 1964. The Brezhnev-Kosygin 
team immediately ended anti-Chinese polemics, apparently 
trying to normalize relations, and Peking responded
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favorably. However, in 1968 the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the "Brezhnev 
doctrine" (asserting Moscow's right to intervene in 
Communist countries where policies deviated from 
Kremlin standards) convinced Chinese leaders that the 
Russians were capable of attacking China as well. By 
I969 Peking's border troops numbered more than a million, 
and Soviet military build-up had reached huge propor­
tions. Skirmishes occurred on March 2, March 15» anc* 
again in mid-June. On September 11 a brief but decisive 
meeting between Chou En-lai and Kosygin took the Chinese 
and Russians off their collision course. They agreed 
to open talks which began on October 19» but after more 
than a year of negotiation, the only visible result was 
that the slide toward war had been arrested in late 
1969. The talks did nothing to halt the exchanges of 
vitriolic propaganda, nor did they discourage the continuing 
reinforcement of frontier zones. In 1971 and 1972 the 
Kremlin was still building up its troop strength in 
Siberia and Central Asia while the Chinese were stiffen­
ing their air defenses with new radar networks, surface- 
to-air-missiles, and other modern equipment.^
The political and intellectual climate described in 
the preceding chapter of this work profoundly affected 
perception and interpretation of the events detailed 
above. The earliest publications on Sino-Soviet relations
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following Stalin's death emphasized Russo-Chinese
solidarity. In 1954, C. M. Chang said that Peking's
sense of solidarity with Moscow in an international
cause went much deeper than most observers imagined.
Any appearance of their being out of step was merely a
strategem to further befuddle a confused world. "Those
who expect Moscow and Peking to get in each other's
7way and trip each other up will be disappointed."
Another publication clearly representative of its
time was Moscow-Peking Axis. Strengths and Strains (1957)»
by Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely,
and Benjamin Schwartz. This collection of essays was
intended to educate the reader to the implications of
the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the consensus was that
"the general community of belief and purpose underlying
the Sino-Soviet alliance give prospect of its being a
0
reasonably durable and highly effective union."
G. F. Hudson, also in 1957» expressed opinions 
similar to those of Boorman, Eckstein, Mosely, and Schwartz. 
He contended that during Stalin's lifetime there had 
been no dispute between Peking and Moscow that reached 
the dimensions of a publicly acknowledged conflict. 
De-Stalinization and praise for collective leadership 
had been embarrassing to Mao, but "now that Khrushchev 
has made a clean sweep of his rivals and abruptly put 
an end to collective leadership in Moscow, he and Mao 
will be able to meet on equal terms as fully autocratic
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9leaders of totalitarian party states,"
On October 6, 1957* Christian Herter said .at a 
news conference that from outward appearances it seemed 
that the Russians and the Chinese were working very closely 
together.^
Considering this climate of opinion, the emergence 
of a school of thought considering schism between the 
Soviet Union and China a myth, unimportant, and even 
dangerous if pursued by the West is certainly under­
standable, Adherents to this school maintained that the 
Communist powers had an overriding aim in common— the 
conquest of the non-Communist world— and that they pursued 
this aim relentlessly and in cooperation.
The most radical representative of such thought
was the November 5» 19^0 supplement to National Review.
"Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow
and Peking?" In his article, "Operation Will-o*-the-
Wisp," which served as an introduction to the supplement,
James Burnham ridiculed C. L. Sulzberger and Joseph
Alsop for suggesting the possibility of a break between
China and the U.S.S.R. He continued by stating that
although most persons believed the Sino-Soviet conflict
formula to be true, this did not guarantee that they
were correct. "*The Sino-Soviet conflict* may be only
the latest in the fifty-seven-year series of strategic
will-o*-the-wisps that have beckoned the West away from
11the main road"
In the same supplement, David Nelson Rowe expressed his
view of the Russo-Chinese relationship in "Chinese History."
According to Mr. Rowe, the dependence of the Chinese
Communists upon Russia was required by the objective
situation in which they found themselves. Any slight,
temporary problems, if they existed, were not enough to
threaten the alliance; moreover, the Chinese Communists
could feel that in terms of China's history and tradition
their dependence was psychologically and politically
acceptable to themselves and to their people. So far
as they sought guidance from their history, they had
no reason to wish or expect that the relationship would
12be altered in the near future.
"Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between
Moscow and Peking?" also included "Demography" by Karl
A. Wittfogel, in which he offered the following comments
When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the 
First World War the communists controlled 200 
million people, that after the Second World 
War they controlled 900 million people, and 
that the next major holocaust would probably 
destroy all remaining non-communist power 
centers, he was expressing his belief in an 
historical perspective that makes any idea of 
a break-between Peking and Moscow palpably 
absurd. ^
Similar opinions were expressed in the same supplement
1 if, 15
by Natalie Grant, Wlodzimierz Baczkowski, _ and
16Stefan T. Possony.
This school of thought neither began, (as has been 
illustrated), nor ended with the November 5» I960 
supplement to National Review. In I96I, A. R. Field
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published an article in which he discussed Sino-Soviet
relations. He stated that he did not agree with
Western observers who suggested that the long-term
interests of the Soviets and Chinese would eventually
clash in Sinkiang. The development of industries
in the area seemed to negate such an argument. In
fact, Russian and Chinese industrial complexes appeared
to be slowly shifting closer together— a fact suggesting
that whatever antagonisms that might exist were being
17kept well within bounds.
In 1962 the book Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects
of Sino-Soviet Relations contained several articles similar 
to Mr. Fields' and those appearing in "Bear and Dragon,
What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?." Peter
H. S. Tang, in "Sino-Soviet Border Regions: Their Changing
Character," expressed the opinion that all Sino-Soviet 
dealings must be viewed within the context of the two 
countries' determination to secure the victory of inter­
national Communism. He felt some observers' judgment 
that Moscow and Peking would eventually clash along their 
common borders was unrealistic, for it was unlikely 
that either would be willing to jeopardize the triumph 
they expected for Communism by indulging in fraternal
strife, especially in such a petty area as economic
18and physical encroachment in the border areas.
As late as I966, at least one reputable academician,
George E. Taylor, upheld this same point of view. He
maintained that because the West still had to deal with
the bloc as a whole, the Sino-Soviet conflict made no
difference to the American position in Asia. Peking and
Moscow still had fundamental interests in common which
would outweigh any possible differences, and he warned
that in concentrating on the dispute Americans risked
overlooking the effective unity of the Communist bloc.
Peking and Moscow could not be regarded as two utterly
19separate powers, for they were not.
It may be noted at this point that three of the 
scholars in the first school of thought, Messrs. Rowe, 
Wittfogel and Taylor, were among those academicians 
who, in 19^9» accused liberal Asia scholars of contributing 
to Communist victory in China by the mere expression 
of their beliefs. Two of the three are China scholars.
Not all observers were quite so right-wing as those 
of this first school, however, and slightly less con­
servative opinions did appear'. A second school emerged 
which contended that while a shared determination to 
establish Communism throughout the world set limits 
on the conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, 
there were indeed serious differences between them. The 
basic divergence between the first and second schools 
of thought, then, was that the second acknowledged the 
existence of significant tensions within the axis.
John F. Kennedy was one of the earliest observers to
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comment upon Sino-Soviet problems.:
The fragmentation of authority within 
the Soviet orbit has been one of the main 
gains of the post-Stalinist era. The totali­
tarian succession has not passed easily from 
Stalin to Khrushchev. There are other 
Communists— Mao, Tito, <8omulka— who claim 
to speak with Communism's authentic voice. 
Nationalism is a force cutting into the 
Soviet world as well as the Western. What 
will be the full effect of the growth of 
these centripetal currents remains to be 
seen, but Mao is surely right in the belief 
that Moscow's one total monopoly of the 
gardener's craft has gone.
He continued by condemning the stifling atmosphere that
it
prevented legitimate dissent: There have been and still
are good reasons for non-recognition of China; but we
must take care not to rigidify our policy through
ignorance, failing to detect change in the objective
situation when it comes. If criticism is not allowed,
policy becomes rigid and vested interests harden to
\
the point where established viewpoints cannot be
"21altered.
As President, Kennedy changed his tune somewhat.
At a news conference on November 8, 1961, he said that
91 none of us can talk with precision about the details
of relationships between Russia and China. It is a
matter of surmise and on this experts may differ.
Therefore, I don't feel that it is probably useful now
22for us to attempt to assess it."'
In December 1959 a survey of the United States' 
foreign needs for the future was made public by the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund. It had been prepared by a
fourteen-man team headed by two former assistant
secretaries of state, Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Dean
Rusk. The report observed that a rift in the Sino-
Soviet alliance was not to be expected in the near
future, but the coming decade might see a strain between
the two powers. The panel warned against a policy that
might drive the two countries closer together, but
added that actions designed to split them would probably 
23fail. Later testimony of Rusk before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee indicated that he was
2cognizant of Sino-Soviet differences.
Chester Bowles expressed sentiments similar to
those held by Kennedy in his senatorial days. He believed
America had the power to play a significant role in
Asian affairs, but he questioned whether we had the
tact, subtlety,.and flexibility. To begin, we needed
to put aside some of our doctrinaire preconceptions and
realistically examine the complexity of the Sino-Soviet
relationship. "Deep potential differences exist between
Chinese and Russian Communism as a result of the radically
different cultures, experiences and leaderships in the 
i 23two countries." ^ He added that no outsider could be 
certain of the present or future state of Sino-Soviet 
relations, but the assumption that there was a rigid, 
monolithic, and unchangeable alliance was out of date. 
Consequently, efforts of State Department officials to 
depict Khrushchev as the leader of a world Communist
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movement and to chastise him for not keeping China in
line were self-defeating and naive. He proposed that
we realize that both Communist alliances and Communist
nations were subject to the eroding effects of national-
26ism, history, and economics.
A. Doak Barnett, a well-known China scholar, believed
in i960 that strong ideological, political, military,
and economic ties united Peking and Moscow. They shared
common aims and gained mutual advantages from their
alliance, and both would pay a tremendous price if it
were dissolved. Yet, beneath the surface, there were
significant tensions, problems, and differences that could
27-not be denied.
Another member of the second school, Roderick
MacFarquhar, said in "Sino-Soviet Relations" that
economic considerations would seem unlikely to allow
friction to endanger monolithic solidarity within the
bloc, but that China's dissent from Soviet Russia's
28political concepts was indeed serious. Peter Mayer 
said essentially the same thing in Sino-Soviet Relations 
Since the Death of Stalin.2^
In I96I, Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledged that ideology 
was a source of friction between Russia and China, yet 
he argued that the dispute had been and would continue 
to be confined by three limits, consciously observed 
by both parties;
1) Both parties have recognized that
6o
both would lose by an open split, hence 
that unity must be preserved; 2) each 
realized that the other’s leadership is firmly 
entrenched and that, for better or worse, 
Khrushchev would have to deal with Mao Tse- 
tung and vice versa . . . ; 3) the Chinese, 
for the time being at least, have striven to 
reassure the Soviets that they are not trying 
to displace them as leaders of the bloc but 
are merely anxious to persuade them to adopt 
a different strategy. . . .
The bloc is not splitting and is not 
likely to split. To talk of a Sino-Soviet 
conflict, or even war between them, merely 
illustrates a profound misconception of the 
essence of the historical phenomenon of 
Communism, which, while affected by tradition­
al national considerations, has from its 
very beginning reflected a conscious emphasis 
.on supra-national perspectives.—
Brzezinski elaborated in "The Problematics of Sino-
Soviet Bargaining," (1962).^* He felt that serious
elements of friction within the alliance could only
be described as those between two unequal units that
32could win "only if they stay together," or each lose 
alone. This resulted in a conflict with an overriding 
common interest, the nature of which was not likely to 
be altered substantially. "Naive tinkering and continu­
ous wishful talk about a Sino-Soviet split can,have 
only one effects to draw them closer together. One
cannot promote a heresy in a church to which one does 
33not belong." ^
Kurt London, who edited Unity and Contradiction, 
in which Brzezinski’s 1962 article appeared, stated 
that he was unwilling to make any concrete predictions 
as to where conflicts between the Soviets and Chinese 
would lead the alliance, but he personally was reluctant
61
to believe they would sacrifice their most valuable
34asset--the unity of the socialist camp.
That same year, Donald S. Zagoria published a
monograph, The Sino-Soviet Conflict. 1956-61, in which
differences between the Chinese and Russians were
covered thoroughly; yet he also minimized the possibility
3 <
of an open schism.^ An article he published in Foreign
*a 6
Affairs reflected the same thought.
William E. Griffith continued along the same 
line: "One should still beware of predicting an in­
evitable, total and above all permanent Sino-Soviet 
37break." The same thought was voiced in later years
OQ 3Q
by Franz Michael^ and Robert A. Scalapino. And in
I97I9 0. Edmund Clubb published what seems to be a
logical extension of such thought. China and Russia:
The Great Game.' Clubb believed that the Sino-Soviet
rift was of Mao Tse-tung* s personal choice and making,
instead of representing a Moscow decision or even the
consensus of the eighth Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Central Committee plenum before Mao's purge: "The
quarrel was between two party leaderships that happened
40to be in charge of their respective states." He also 
felt that from the time when Moscow directed its attack 
specifically against Mao, it was apparent that if Mao 
were to be removed from power and his hostile policy 
toward Russia were abandoned by his successors, the 
Sino-Soviet alliance could once more be made into a
6 2
working political and economic arrangement. The
relationship could not he restored to its 1950-56
condition, but Mao would pass, and China would be directed
by a new leadership--probably a more pragmatic one.
And with the advent of pragmatists to power 
in Peking, the Sino-Soviet alliance could, 
without any great difficulty, be made to 
operate in a fashion that would service some 
of China's basic needs— and would, in correspond­
ing satisfaction of a Soviet desideratum, 
preserve China as a buffer zone between 
Soviet Siberia and the America^naval and 
air power in the West Pacific.
A third school of thought eventually emerged which 
held that the tensions within the axis acknowledged by 
those of the second school rendered a break inevitable. 
Adherents to this school argued that the interests of 
the two Communist partners were ultimately incompatible. 
Viewpoints varied depending upon the importance accorded 
to the place of ideology in Russian and Chinese motivation. 
One position was that Russia was becoming a status quo 
power, its conflict with China arising from the fact 
that its interests necessarily diverged from those of 
a partner whose population pressure and revolutionary 
fervor drove it to expand at all cost. Another view was 
that the national interests of the two cpuntries conflicted 
and that competition for control over border areas 
such as Outer Mongolia must lead them to split. Finally, 
some within this school maintained that rupture between 
China and Russia was inevitable because the Communist 
system demands absolutely centralized control, and
neither Russia nor China would relinquish its claim 
ho
to power.
One of the earliest publications to emphasize 
tensions between China and Russia so strongly as to 
imply a split was Allen S . Whiting's "Contradictions 
in the Moscow-Peking Axis," published in the Journal 
of Politics. February 1958. Mr. Whiting discussed the 
military, economic, and ideological aspects of the rela­
tionship at length, ending his article with an analogy 
between Sino-Soviet and Anglo-American relations:
The concatenation of military, economic, and 
ideological trends in the Sino-Soviet alliance 
point to increasing independence of Peking 
from Moscow. If the comparison with the 
Anglo-American relations offers any insight 
it lies in dismissing alternative categories 
of 'satellite' and 'equal partners.' Neither 
category offers an accurate enough descrip­
tion of reality to be meaningful in a wide 
range of specific instances. Just as Stalin's 
view of the Anglo-American alliance suffered 
from a'simplistic analysis remaining fixed 
over time, so certain Western estimates of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance appear remote and rigid, 
requiring close appraisal of the dynamics of 
divisive as well-as of cohesive forces in 
trend analysis. ^
Mr. Whiting carried his analysis further in "Conflict 
Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in which he 
stated that two things seemed certain. In the 1960's, 
serious problems confronted coordination within the 
Moscow-Peking axis. As Chinese power increased relative 
to that of the Soviet Union and as the interests of 
the two countries expanded geographically, the partners 
would have increasing opportunity to differ and decreasing
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opportunity to impose their will upon each other; and
by focusing upon the tensions within the axis, the West
44could contribute toward a better response to it.
Like Whiting, the Marxist journalist Isaac Deutscher 
spotted problems early. In his syndicated article of 
August 14, 1958» Deutscher discussed the Middle Eastern 
turmoil, which he felt had revealed a crisis in the 
Soviet-Chinese relationship. According to Deutscher, 
it was the revelation of discrepancy between Moscow's 
and Peking's reactions to the events in the Middle East 
that sent a gravely disturbed Khrushchev on his journey 
to China. Having gone to the brink, Khrushchev felt 
disconcerted by Chinese backseat driving. During the 
three days of Mao's and Khrushchev's conference there 
was hard bargaining, and there were mutual concessions. 
While Khrushchev called off the planned summit meeting 
over the Middle East, Mao acknowledged the merits of 
summit diplomacy in general and recognized in advance 
that Khrushchev would be acting correctly if he sought 
another summit meeting on some future occasion. "The 
outcome was thus a token of coordination and a compromise, 
which is not, however, likely to prove very stable."^
In December i960, Deutscher voiced his opinion that 
the Declaration of the Eighty-One Communist Parties 
(published by Moscow on December 6, i960), for all its 
elaborate character and stylistic elan, was not likely 
to put an end to the controversy. It would, rather,
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serve as one of those texts which each disputant could,
and unquestionably would, quote in support of his own
46views and policies.
In 1959» G. F. Hudson was expressing opinions quite 
different from those he had held in 1957- Indeed, by 
the end of the fifties he was in accord with Whiting and 
Deutschers "The decision to set up communes in China 
was indeed a parting of the ways, and there is no turning 
back."^
Joseph Alsop also suggested a parting of the- ways
in September i960:
A threatened break between the Soviet Union 
and Communist China looks more and more like 
the missing piece in the deeply disturbing 
puzzle of recent Soviet behavior. . . . Even 
the smallest possibility of a break could be 
counted on to exert great pressure on Khrush­
chev. But the evidence suggests that the 
possibility is not small. It is no slim 
chance now, but rather a strong possibility.
If a mid-October meeting between Khrushchev 
and Mao fails to compose the conflict, however, 
the betting will be rather better than even 
on an open Sino-Soviet break at the meeting 
of communist leaders over all the world that no 
is expected to be held in Moscow in November.
Another observer who viewed the situation as Whiting, 
Deutscher, and Alsop did was Ferdinand Lundberg. After 
having read Donald S. Zagoria's "China's Threat to 
Russia," New Leader. April 24, I96I, Lundberg drew a 
more far-reaching conclusion than the possibility of 
Eastern and Western empires of Communism centered in 
Peking and Moscow, as Zagoria had suggested. Mr.
Lundberg maintained that Moscow and Peking were conducting
a political war on two fronts, one veiled and the other
in the open— against each other and against the bourgeois
world. The whole history of Leninist Communism testified
that one or the other must knuckle under unless there
was to be an open competition for power. Sharing
power was impossible under Communism; such sharing was
bourgeois. When one considered the need of the
Communist system for absolutely centralized power it was
hard to see how one could magnify the significance of
Chinese-Russian differences. Nationalism and culture
had been the big contradictions within Communism since
the emergence of Red China, and no Communist faction
since 1917 had voluntarily subordinated itself to 
49another.
There were others who stated similar opinions.
Marvin Kalb concluded in Dragon in the Kremlin that 
for economic, ideological, and military reasons, it was 
clear that the Russian-Chinese alliance had been plagued 
by a rash of disagreements and anxieties. Both Peking 
and Moscow seemed to realize that they were bound by a 
common ideology which gave them strength, purpose, and 
direction, yet they had been unable to reduce the 
frequency and intensity of their disputes. Developments 
indicated that strong disruptive pressures existed within 
the alliance, but it would be folly to anticipate its 
dissolution owing to these pressures. It was likely 
that for the immediate future the Russo-Chinese axis
would continue to function as a viable and powerful 
political, economic, and diplomatic force. The key 
phrase in Kalb's analysis was "for the immediate future. 
He predicted that when China exploded a nuclear bomb 
it was possible that tensions between Moscow and Peking 
would force a rupture between them. Therefore, the 
United States should adopt a highly flexible foreign 
policy aimed at exploiting divisive pressures so.that 
Moscow and Peking would be deprived of the opportunity 
of facing the U.S. as a united team. He suggested that 
the United States should recognize the People's Repub­
lic of China; admit it to the United Nations; recognize 
the government of Outer Mongolia; make every effort to 
begin a program of exchanges with Communist China; find 
areas where our interests coincided with the Soviet 
Union's, and if possible, embark on joint projects; 
and educate China specialists in the United States.^
Like Kalb, Alexander Dallin also discussed dissen­
sion between the two Communist giants. He felt that the 
rift between them had stimulated competition for control 
of the international Communist movement. Unwilling 
and unable to turn his back on international Communism 
as a failure, Khrushchev was given the choice between 
two contrary impulses in coping with dissension in the 
movement. He could strive to maintain a fictitious 
unity in the Communist world, or he could revert to 
classical Bolshevik principles of organization:
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determination to preserve a pure nucleus at all times.
(Lenin's Better Fewer but Better provided the formula
for the second approach.) "Whatever the formal outcome,
the discrepancy between universal ideology and fragmented
authority points toward more, rather than less, tension
51and conflict within international Communism."
Stavro Skendi reached the same conclusion in analyzing
52the Albanian problem.
After the polemical winter of 1962-63* there were 
still those who doubted the seriousness of Sino-Soviet 
antagonisms, but there were many who voiced an opposite 
point of view. In his July 3* 1963 article, Isaac 
Deutscher said that over the last several years the 
Russians and the Chinese had agreed to disagree, but 
now they were unable to agree even on this. "The
monolith has in fact broken; and no one can put it
53together a g a i n . E x a c t l y  the same opinion was
expressed by Edward Crankshaw in The New Cold Wars
54Moscow v. Pekin, and by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (who
had completely reversed his 1962 opinion), in "Threat
55and Opportunity in the 'Communist Schism," (1963)•
56Brzezinski held to this view in later years, and
57he was supported by others such as George F.Kerman,
Lucian Pye,^ Richard Lowenthal,^ Bernard Fall.,
William E. Griffith (who by 1967 had reversed his 
1964 position)^ and John King Fairbank.^
As Sino-Soviet animosity flared, some observers, who
came to constitute a fourth school of thought, developed
a more extreme view than that of most other commentators
Walter Z. Laqueur said in 19&2 that "for world Communism
6 31961 was the year of the great schism." Even if the 
Sino-Soviet dispute could be resolved (a most unlikely 
prospect), world Communism would never again be the 
same. For the more distant future, even the possibility 
of war between China and the Soviet Union could not be 
ruled out.
What separated Laqueur and others of similar 
persuasion into a distinct school, therefore, was that 
they seriously discussed the possibility of war between 
Russia and China.
In 1966, Thomas W. Wolfe spoke of the possibility
64of war in the future, and in 19^9> Harrison Salisbury*
s
War Between Russia and China appeared. To the question, 
"Is war between the Soviet Union and China inevitable?," 
Salisbury's answer in 19&9 was a qualified "no," the 
qualification being that if events were permitted to 
continue on the present pattern, war would become 
inevitable. He maintained that if the United States 
were to take a serious role in the Sino-Soviet dispute 
it needed to establish a viable relationship with 
China. Concerning the possibility of Sino-Soviet 
detente following the death of Mao Tse-tung, Salisbury 
stated that the possibility should not be overlooked, 
because unexpected, illogical events change the course
of world history, but the odds against rapproachement
i 65were long. ^
In I970, L. LaDany said that China, for its part,
probably did not want warj but it feared attack and was
therefore engaged in military preparation.^ Hans
Morgenthau, too, emphasized the possibility of war.
Oton Ambroz concluded in Realignment of World Power
that "it seems unlikely therefore that a change of
leadership in Peking will itself significantly affect
the substance of the dispute. . . .  The Russo-Chinese
conflict has deep historic roots and the Communist
regimes were simply not able to change the hard geo-
68political facts." On the question of war, Ambroz 
pointed out that military experts studying the logistic 
infrastructure of Russia's war industry and transpor­
tation system came to the conclusion that Moscow was 
preparing itself for action against Red China. A large 
portion of China's armed forces and missile bases, on 
the other hand, were stationed in the country's northern 
and western parts along the border with the Soviet 
Union. He ruled out complete reconciliation between the 
Communist big two: "The Sino-Soviet axis was an un­
natural alliance, and its collapse should be viewed 
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as natural." Stanley Karnow expressed similar senti-
70ments in Mao and China.
Like Salisbury, Ambroz, and Karnow, Richard Thornton 
wrote of Sino-Soviet tensions. In The Bear and Dragon:
71
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Evolution of the Chinese
People's Republic, 1949-1971t Thornton did not rule out
any relaxation of tensions between the two countries,
but he considered it unlikely. He concluded that,
from the Soviet viewpoint at least, indications suggested
that the U.S.S.R. was more likely to develop a long
range pincer envelopment of China, while maintaining a
71powerful position along the border.
As time passed, some observers came to believe
that while severe Sino-Soviet tensions still persisted,
the danger of war was over. This, then, constitutes a
fifth school of thought.
One analyst in this school, Richard Lowenthal
(who had shifted from an earlier position), expressed
the opinion that the continuation of controlled conflict
between China and Russia was a more plausibles prospect
for the future than its end by either reunion or 
72catastrophe.
Michel Oksenburg presented a somewhat more sanguine
analysis: "Following the armed clashes in 1969 over the
disputed islands in the Ussuri River in Manchuria, Sino-
Soviet relations have improved somewhat. Peking and
Moscow plan increases in their trade and are engaged in
border talks."^
On the same topic, Seymour Topping said:
Between June 1959 and October 1961, the 
Chinese-Soviet alliance in effect dissolved. .. . 
the Chinese, faced with the prospect of a 
lasting confrontation with Soviet military
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forces superior in strength to their own 
were compelled to look for new political 
and diplomatic arrangements invthe world 
to bolster their position vis-a-vis Moscow.
The task was given to Chou En-lai, and he 
responded with a search for new allies and 
Ping-Pong diplomacy.
It could be said that in the era that began with 
Russia's acquisition of advanced nuclear weapons,
Communist China's emergence as a great power, and Stalin's 
death, the main fault of American policymakers lay in 
misperception. Not understanding the internal weaknesses 
within the Communist world that could have offered 
options for American diplomacy contributed greatly to 
this misperception. Although Sino-Soviet estrangement 
has altered drastically the balance of world power, 
knowledge of the split was limited to the specially 
initiated alone for many years. The following chart,* 
listing the professionals in the schools of thought 
discussed in these pages, should make the reasons for 
this clearer. Academicians are labeled with (A), 
journalists with (J), policymakers with (P), and China 
scholars are specially indicated with asterisks. 
Publication dates follow the name of each author.
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School #1 School #2
Those who saw no problems 
or few problems and expected 
no split
Those who expected no split, 
but saw severe problems 
within the axis
(A) c. Chang *57 (P) J. Kennedy *57, 9 61
(A) * G. Hudson • 57 (P) A. Berle, Jr. *59
(A) * H. Boorman ’57 (P) D. Rusk *59, 9 62
(A) A. Eckstein •57 (P) C. Bowles 96o
(A) P. Mosely '57 (A) * D. Barnett 9 60
(A) * B. Schwartz '57 (A) # R. MacFarquhar 9 61
9 62(P) C. Herter '57 (A) z. Brzezinski 9 6 1 ,
(A) J. Burnham 9 60 (A) K. London 9 62
(A) * D. Rowe 9 60 (A) P. Mayer 9 62
(A) * K. Wittfogel 9 60 (A) D. Zagoria •>6 2, 9 62
(P) N. Grant 96o (A) W. Griffith * 6k
(A) W. Baczkowski 9 60 (A) * R. Scalapino 9 6k, 9 66
(A) S. Possony 9 60 (A) F. Michael 9 66
(A) A. Field 9 61 (P) * E. Clubb 9 71
(A) P. Tang 962
(A) G. Taylor 9 66
School #3
Those who saw problems which 
they expected to cause a split
School # k -
Those who talked of war
(J) I. Deutscher •58,*63 (A) W. Laqueur •62
(A) * A . Whiting • 58,162 (A) T. Wolfe * 66
(A) * G. Hudson * 59,* 60 (J) H. Salisbury •69
(J) ' J. Alsop '60 (J) L. LaDany *70
(J) H. Salisbury • 60 (A) H. Morgenthau 9 71
(J) M. Kalb •61 (J) S. Karnow •72
(J) F. Lundberg •61 (A) 0. Ambroz *72
(A) R . Lowenthal • 61,'66 (A) R. Thornton •72
(A) R. Skendi •62
(A) A. Dallin *62
(J) E . Crankshaw '61,*63
(A) Z. Brzezinski •63,'6 6 ,•72
(P) G . Kennan 9 6k ,* 66
(A) L. Pye • 66
(A) B. Fall • 66
(A) W. Griffith •67
(A) * J . Fairbank •72
School #5
Those who believed that tensions 
persisted, but danger of war had 
passed
(A) R. Lowenthal 9 71
(A) M. Oksenburg 971
(J) S. Topping 972
The preceding chart represents the opinions of 
thirty-seven (37) academicians, nine (9) journalists, 
and eight (8) policymakers. Among scholars, one can see 
a liberal-conservative split, with twenty-three calling 
for Sino-Soviet unity. Hudson, who expected no split 
in 1957, had changed his opinion by 1959- Brzezinski 
reversed his position during the winter of 1962-63 when 
polemics were flying back and forth between Russia and 
China, and Griffith did the same some time between 
196^ and 1967. Including these three, seventeen academi­
cians expected a Sino-Soviet split. One of this group, 
Lowenthal, moved from School #3 to School #5 between 
1966 and 1971- All nine journalists expected a split, 
but seven of the eight policymakers did not, at least 
according to their public statements.
These figures suggest several things. First, the 
journalists as a group were more astute in perceiving 
the reality of Sino-Soviet antagonisms than were the 
academicians and the policymakers. This could possibly 
be attributed to the fact that journalists are by nature 
more gregarious than scholars and are therefore more often 
placed in situations where current events are discussed 
by those who make them. It would seem, however, that 
other factors are also involved. It was noted in an 
earlier chapter of this work that journalists as well 
as academicians and policymakers were affected by the 
McCarthyite purges. Theodore White stopped writing on 
China for some time, and Edgar Snow changed his base
to Switzerland. Our survey of professional perceptions
of the Sino-Soviet split would indicate, however, that
the effects of McCarthyism lingered in academia and
government much longer than in journalism. Perhaps the
long and tedious preparation required for an. academic
career makes scholars less willing to tackle issues
that could jeopardize their positions than journalists
whose formal preparation seldom demands more than a
four-year degree. In fairness to scholars, however,
one will note that there was evidence of suppression
of maverick works (e.g. Ross Koen's The China Lobby in
American Politics was purged from library shelves in 
7 5i960). J .1 do not know of similar examples in journalism, 
though they may have existed.
There is also a crucial difference between the 
traditional roles of journalists and academicians. 
Journalists are expected to report events as they 
occur. If the happenings of today overturn the judgment 
made in yesterday's article, then so be it. The world, 
after all, is in flux. Academic specialists, on the other 
hand, in admitting they were wrong, may have to renounce 
years of work upon which they have built a reputation. 
Consequently, such respected and perceptive scholars as 
Brzezinski were slow to give up public adherence to the 
ideology of monolithic Communism. Strict adherence to 
this ideology rendered more than half of the scholars 
represented in this paper incapable of perceiving the 
demise of a monolith even in the face of overwhelming
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evidence pointing in that direction.
One will notice that the majority of China scholars 
represented here are on the radical right or rightist 
side of the spectrum. A second implication of this 
survey, then, is that the severe treatment of Asia 
scholars in the late forties and early fifties left 
deep scars that are evident in their writings on Sino- 
Soviet relations. The suggestion is that not only were 
the China experts directed by ideology in this instance, 
but by fear of attack. One who has been burned is not 
likely to stick his hand into another fire.
Some Asia scholars have contrasted their field and 
Russian studies to stress the former's independence from govern­
ment. The fact that Russia scholars did not suffer 
attack during the McCarthy era suggests to them that 
the Russian field was more closely aligned with govern- 
ment views than the Chinese field. There may be some 
validity to this claim, but one must take into considera­
tion here that Russia had not recently been "lost."
Russia scholars were not attacked because there was no 
need to blame them for anything. After all, the Russian 
Revolution occurred in 1917--not 19^ *9*
It is true, however, that there are differences in 
the backgrounds of the majority of scholars in these two 
fields. There were few experts on the Soviet Union before 
World War II. The immediate post-war boom in Russian 
studies was largely a product of interest in the Soviet
Union as the enemy. China studies, on the other hand, 
had been dominated by scholars of Chinese culture and 
history. Because the large scale study of Russia developed 
initially in a Cold War context, the field came to be 
dominated by professional anti-Communists, military 
strategists, and Eastern European and Russian emigres.
These are interesting differences with implications 
for separate periods of recent American history. It is 
possible that these differences contributed to the vehemence 
of attack upon China scholars during the McCarthy era and 
the relatively immune position of Russia scholars. But 
for this very reason, Russia scholars could depart from 
orthodoxy sooner than Asia scholars would dare risk.
Academic discussion of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 
fifties and sixties was more conservative on the part of 
China scholars than on the part of other academicians,
I believe, because of their different experiences in the 
McCarthy era.
Policymakers, unlike journalists and academicians, 
present special problems for the historian who attempts 
to analyze their statements. Anyone familiar with 
American political life would suspect that there is 
often significant divergence between the privately- 
held and publicly-announced beliefs of policymakers, 
resulting from the fact that they rely upon public 
whim for their positions. If some policymakers were 
cognizant of the true nature of Sino-Soviet relations
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during the period we have studied, I believe there were 
several reasons why they would not have made their beliefs 
public. The first reason would be the Cold War slant 
of public opinion; the second would be the memory of what 
happened to government Asia specialists such as 0.
Edmund Clubb, John S. Service, John Paton Davies, and 
John Carter Vincent, during the McCarthy era. Government 
specialists, like China scholars and unlike Russia scholars, 
suffered horribly during the McCarthy purges. Although 
some journalists suffered also, they neither spent as 
many years preparing for their careers as did academicians, 
nor depended upon public approval for their jobs as did 
elected policymakers. Compounding the effects of these 
factors would be the conservative input of the national 
security managers who emerged after World War II. As 
their power came from and depended completely upon those 
they advised, they could be and were easily led into 
feeding their superiors the information they most likely 
wanted to hear. I believe these factors directed the 
public opinions of policymakers toward conservatism 
concerning China policy and Sino-Soviet relations 
between 19^5 a-nd 1972, and I have no knowledge that their 
private opinions were different, although they may have 
been. The only policymaker surveyed here who made any 
public statement of recognition of the Sino-Soviet 
split was George Kennan, and he was no longer in govern­
ment. Thus, it would appear that there are several
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reasons for the lag in perception by policymakers as well 
as by academicians and for the comparative insight of 
j ournalists.
Another inference I draw from this survey is that 
policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions 
of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating 
Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972. I do not 
mean, however, that academicians had an effective input 
in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press 
was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a 
basic difference between the government-university rela­
tionship and the government-journalistic relationship—  
a difference that still exists. The latter relationship 
reveals relatively more independence. After World War 
II. area studies departments were begun in universities all 
over the country. In case after case, they were financed 
through government grants. Academicians either followed 
the line of orthodoxy in order to’attract funds, or they 
retreated into the private "think tanks."
A case in point of how the government used academic 
opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University 
in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967* He 
described a series of policy-planning sessions in the 
State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department 
as an adviser at that time). Such issues were discussed 
as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach 
fractured Communist parties in third world countries,
8°
should we manipulate the Sino-Soviet split or lie low,
and what should he done vis-a-vis mainland China.
Thomson revealed that to many in the Department, this
represented the first realization that there was a split
between Russia and China. Thomson wanted to use the
split to begin a rapproachement with the People's Republic
77of China, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk refused.
What is interesting is how the bureaucracy in the 
Department and the White House decided to deal with the 
China problem. Rusk initiated a study on China to be 
undertaken on the outside under foundation grant. What 
resulted v/as an eleven-volume work on "The United States 
and China in World Affairs," edited by Robert Blum and 
written by top China experts, including A. Doak Barnett,
A. M. Halpern, Lucian Pye, and Alexander Eckstein. The 
volumes produced represented the views of top American 
China experts on many facets of Sino-American relations. 
The conception and execution of the study show how 
scholars were mobilized and funds made available for one 
government policy study, and the suggestion is that the 
process has been and is repeated. This example defines 
the role of the area expert and his function as a public 
relations man for policymakers— not to furnish policy­
makers with new ideas— but to hush clamors for liberaliza­
tion of policy. The result in this instance was a weighty 
Council on Foreign Relations study that gave the Rusk 
containment policy the academic seal of approval.
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Another suggestion of this survey is that led by 
the journalists all interpreters of Sino-Soviet affairs 
have tended to drift very, very slowly from School #1 
tov/ard Schools #4 and #5.
This survey of the perception of the Sino-Soviet 
split by three American professional groups, then, 
suggests several things. First, journalists were 
undeniably more astute in perceiving the realities of the 
split than were academicians and policymakers. Several 
factors could have contributed to this outcome. Journal­
ists tend to be more gregarious by nature than academicians, 
thus placing themselves more often in social situations 
where world affairs are discussed by those who make them.
The shorter academic preparation required for a journalistic 
career compared to the long and tedious preparation 
required for the scholar may make the latter more hesitant 
to voice opinions that could possibly jeopardize his 
position; and, finally, the societal, roles of journalists 
and academicians are quite different. Journalists are 
expected to report events as they occur; scholars fit 
those events into theories based upon years of study 
and reflection. And policymakers, unlike journalists, 
are dependent upon public whim for their positions.
Second, Asia scholars were more conservative in 
their perceptions of Sino-Soviet relations than were 
Russia scholars, and I attribute this to their separate
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treatment during the McCarthy era, Asia scholars having 
been censured and purged while Russia scholars were not.
Third, policymakers failed to perceive the realities 
of the Sino-Soviet split (or admit that they did) for 
several reasons: the Cold War slant of public opinion*
the memory of what had happened to government Asia 
specialists during the McCarthy era; and the conservative 
input of national security managers.
Fourth, policymakers used academic opinion more 
than the opinions of journalists in formulating China 
policy and in treating Sino-Soviet-American relations 
between 19^5 and 1972. This use was not altogether 
healthy, however. "The United States and China in World 
Affairs,” edited by Robert Blum and written by top China 
experts, defined the role of the area expert and his 
function as a public relations man for policymakers, 
not a contributor of new ideas. I suspect that this 
government/university symbiosis is broad and has affected 
American foreign and domestic affairs in general and not 
just Sino-Soviet-American relations between 19^5 and 
1972.
And finally, led by the journalists, all interpreters 
of Sino-Soviet affairs have tended to drift 
very, very slowly from School #1 toward Schools and
#5.
In Chapter IV, we will look concisely at the results 
of this entire study.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I I I
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1For example, see Donald. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet 
Conflict, 1956-61 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1962), pp. 14-19. Not all scholars would agree 
with this, however.
o
The discussion of the second through seventh 
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of Communist Affairs and Assistant Professor of Govern­
ment, Columbia University.
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The Sino-Soviet Piscute (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp.
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this work to demonstrate 
through the study of American China policy from 19^5 to 
1972 and perception of the Sino-Soviet split from 1956 
to 1972 that American foreign policy is no longer a 
separate entity from domestic affairs. It is, rather, 
directed by domestic considerations which ultimately 
rely upon our perceptions of ourselves and others. These 
perceptions do not simply evolve spontaneously; they 
are manipulated, coerced, and distorted by groups and 
individuals who hope to attain the triumph of their 
ideas, or gain personal power and influence, or perhaps 
destroy an enemy. The reasons why American perceptions 
are manipulated are as varied as the manipulators them­
selves. American China policy and American understanding 
of Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972 were the 
outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon 
myth, misperception, and missed opportunities.
After World War II, the people of the United States 
were afraid of powerful enemies whose ideologies conflicted 
with their own. Nazism and Fascism, were no longer 
serious threats to our way of life, but a new ideological
9k
enemy— Communism— had come of age. We were not so much 
afraid of powerful nations as we were of powerful adversary 
ideologies, which we perceived as having transcended the 
older enemy, nationalism. The Soviet Union, a temporary 
ally of necessity during World War II, was a bastion of 
the new enemy ideology and therefore an enemy of the 
United States. Stalin's attempt to create a buffer 
zone in Eastern Europe, v/hich he perceived as a bottom 
line of defense, was perceived in America as Moscow- 
directed Communist aggression. The new enemy, Communism, 
loomed larger and larger in our minds.
Our perception and understanding of China had 
always suffered distortion, and this distortion grew after 
World War II. We clung to the myth that since the 
Revolution of 1911 China had been a developing democracy 
and compounded it with the misperception that under 
Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, it was turning 
toward Christianity. "China market" rhetoric endured, 
and we believed China was essential to American well­
being because of its vast market for American goods.
This market had never really existed, but we told ourselves 
it did so many times that we believed it did. Because 
we also believed Communism was monolithic and Moscow- 
directed, we could not understand Mao and the Civil 
War in China. Mao could not, in our minds, be the leader 
of an indigenous Chinese brand of Communism. China, after 
all, was a developing democracy, and all Commumism was
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directed by the Soviet Union. Because we misunderstood 
so many things, American policymakers missed the opportunity 
to court moderate elements in the Chinese Communist 
movement before and during the spring of 19^9* Had we 
pragmatically established a relationship with the Chinese 
Communists at that time, the history of American foreign 
policy for the subsequent quarter-century might have been 
different. We misperceived the nature and strength of 
the People's Republic and took its bombastic rhetoric 
at face value, basing policy upon the idea, that it was 
dangerously expansionist. Confused at the loss of the 
democratic China that had only existed as a figment of 
our imaginations, we compounded policymaking mistakes 
by formulating China policy upon the myth that the 
People's Republic would soon expire, and China would 
again be ruled by Chiang Kai-shek.
As our fear of Communism continued to grow, re­
development packages for Europe were sold to the American 
public in terms of protecting democracies from Communist 
aggression. We were told that this was essential to 
American national security, but no explanation was 
made of the difference between areas of primary concern 
to American interests (Europe) and areas of secondary 
concern (Asia) . This political gamble on the part of 
the Truman Administration backfired on the gamblers.
The congressional China bloc, the China Lobby, Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million
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developed and spread a well-defined propaganda lines 
China had been essential, to American national security; 
it was "lost" as the result of deliberate treachery 
*>y various private Asia specialists and State Department 
officials; and further damage had to be prevented by 
non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and its 
exclusion from the United Nations. Public reaction to 
China lobbyist propaganda was hysterical. We wanted 
these traitors purged— all of them. The careers of 
reputable China specialists in the State Department 
were destroyed, as were the careers of many in academia, 
and journalists were forced to stop writing on China 
or leave the United States. Policymakers could not 
risk rapproacheraent with China. The suggestion of such 
a ;thought would mean certain professional ruin. In 
short, we were not basing our foreign policy upon rationality, 
but upon fear that began within the continental boundaries 
of the United States and was founded upon gross misper­
ception and deliberate distortion.
After the hysteria of the McCarthy era died down, 
misperception remained to affect American foreign policy.
Since the myth of monolithic Communism was so ingrained 
in our minds, and since informed dissent was professional­
ly dangerous, rigid adherence to orthodoxy dominated 
formulation of China policy as well as policymakers' 
and academicians' perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split. 
Journalists, whose societal roles gave them more independence
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and flexibility than academicians and policymakers 
enjoyed, became aware of the reality of Sino-Soviet 
relations, but policymakers did not listen to them.
The policymaking process had changed greatly since 
World War II. The State Department had declined in 
importance, and national security advisors, whose power 
and positions were dependent upon the elected officials 
they advised, had come to wield authority and influence.
The tendency was for them to over-simplify, fitting 
facts into established theories. Concurrently, a government/ 
university symbiosis developed. The government ordered 
and paid for policy studies; academicians gave them what 
they wanted to hear. After all, funds could be attracted 
that way, and dissent, as the McCarthyite purges proved, 
could be very dangerous. Thus, the propaganda line 
espoused by the China bloc, the China Lobby, Joseph 
McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million, 
triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception by 
unrealistic fear of an ideology different from its own.
This line, which was founded upon myth and gross misper­
ception, molded American thinking into a rigid orthodoxy 
that simply could not allow for a Sino-American rapproach- 
ment or the acknowledgement of a fissure in the Communist 
monolith, in spite of overwhelming evidence that the 
monolith did not in fact exist.' Consequently, many 
American academicians were blinded by ideological rigidity 
and fear, failing to perceive the Sino-Soviet split.
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China scholars, who were censured so severely during the 
McCarthy era, were driven to conservatism. Policymakers, 
bound by orthodoxy and reinforced by national security 
managers with tunnel vision, used scholars as "yes men" 
for their positions by handing out handsome grants for 
policy studies. Finally journalists, from their com­
paratively independent positions, began to voice the 
truth, and America began, slowly, to listen. In 1972, 
an American President visited the People's Republic of 
China, and the correction of a long lasting, serious 
error began.
It has been the thesis of this.work that American 
China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet 
relations between 19^5 and 1972 were the outgrowth of 
domestic affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. 
This misperception began within ourselves and was fed, 
reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the 
policymaking process. It is hoped that similar mistakes 
can be prevented; but prevention cannot come without 
change, and change is never instigated until a need for 
it is realized. There is indeed a need for change; 
this study illustrates the workings of a mistake.
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reasons for the lag in perception "by policymakers as well 
as by academicians and for the comparative insight of 
journalists.
Another inference I draw from this survey is that 
policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions 
of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating 
Sino-Soviet relations between 19^5 and 1972. I do not 
mean, however, that academicians had an effective input 
in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press 
was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a 
basic difference between the government-university rela­
tionship and the government-journalistic relationship—  
a difference that still exists. The latter relationship 
reveals relatively more independence. After World War 
II, area studies departments were begun in universities all 
over the country. In case after case, they were financed 
through government grants. Academicians either followed 
the line of orthodoxy in order to attract funds, or they 
retreated into the private "think tanks."
A case in point of how the government used academic 
opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University 
in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967* He 
described a series of policy-planning sessions in the 
State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department 
as an adviser at that time). Such issues were discussed 
as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach 
fractured Communist parties in third world countries,
